Commit dd0db88d authored by Andrea Arcangeli's avatar Andrea Arcangeli Committed by Linus Torvalds

userfaultfd: non-cooperative: rollback userfaultfd_exit

Patch series "userfaultfd non-cooperative further update for 4.11 merge

Unfortunately I noticed one relevant bug in userfaultfd_exit while doing
more testing.  I've been doing testing before and this was also tested
by kbuild bot and exercised by the selftest, but this bug never
reproduced before.

I dropped userfaultfd_exit as result.  I dropped it because of
implementation difficulty in receiving signals in __mmput and because I
think -ENOSPC as result from the background UFFDIO_COPY should be enough

Before I decided to remove userfaultfd_exit, I noticed userfaultfd_exit
wasn't exercised by the selftest and when I tried to exercise it, after
moving it to a more correct place in __mmput where it would make more
sense and where the vma list is stable, it resulted in the
event_wait_completion in D state.  So then I added the second patch to
be sure even if we call userfaultfd_event_wait_completion too late
during task exit(), we won't risk to generate tasks in D state.  The
same check exists in handle_userfault() for the same reason, except it
makes a difference there, while here is just a robustness check and it's
run under WARN_ON_ONCE.

While looking at the userfaultfd_event_wait_completion() function I
looked back at its callers too while at it and I think it's not ok to
stop executing dup_fctx on the fcs list because we relay on
userfaultfd_event_wait_completion to execute
userfaultfd_ctx_put(fctx->orig) which is paired against
userfaultfd_ctx_get(fctx->orig) in dup_userfault just before
list_add(fcs).  This change only takes care of fctx->orig but this area
also needs further review looking for similar problems in fctx->new.

The only patch that is urgent is the first because it's an use after
free during a SMP race condition that affects all processes if
CONFIG_USERFAULTFD=y.  Very hard to reproduce though and probably
impossible without SLUB poisoning enabled.

This patch (of 3):

I once reproduced this oops with the userfaultfd selftest, it's not
easily reproducible and it requires SLUB poisoning to reproduce.

    general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
    Modules linked in:
    CPU: 2 PID: 18421 Comm: userfaultfd Tainted: G               ------------ T 3.10.0+ #15
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 04/01/2014
    task: ffff8801f83b9440 ti: ffff8801f833c000 task.ti: ffff8801f833c000
    RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81451299>]  [<ffffffff81451299>] userfaultfd_exit+0x29/0xa0
    RSP: 0018:ffff8801f833fe80  EFLAGS: 00010202
    RAX: ffff8801f833ffd8 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RCX: ffff8801f83b9440
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8800baf18600
    RBP: ffff8801f833fee8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
    R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8127ceb3 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: ffff8800baf186b0 R14: ffff8801f83b99f8 R15: 00007faed746c700
    FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88023fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
    CR2: 00007faf0966f028 CR3: 0000000001bc6000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
    DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
    Call Trace:
    Code: 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 54 53 48 83 ec 58 48 8b 1f 48 85 db 75 11 eb 73 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 5b 10 48 85 db 74 64 <4c> 8b a3 b8 00 00 00 4d 85 e4 74 eb 41 f6 84 24 2c 01 00 00 80
    RIP  [<ffffffff81451299>] userfaultfd_exit+0x29/0xa0
     RSP <ffff8801f833fe80>
    ---[ end trace 9fecd6dcb442846a ]---

In the debugger I located the "mm" pointer in the stack and walking
mm->mmap->vm_next through the end shows the vma->vm_next list is fully
consistent and it is null terminated list as expected.  So this has to
be an SMP race condition where userfaultfd_exit was running while the
vma list was being modified by another CPU.

When userfaultfd_exit() run one of the ->vm_next pointers pointed to
SLAB_POISON (RBX is the vma pointer and is 0x6b6b..).

The reason is that it's not running in __mmput but while there are still
other threads running and it's not holding the mmap_sem (it can't as it
has to wait the even to be received by the manager).  So this is an use
after free that was happening for all processes.

One more implementation problem aside from the race condition:
userfaultfd_exit has really to check a flag in mm->flags before walking
the vma or it's going to slowdown the exit() path for regular tasks.

One more implementation problem: at that point signals can't be
delivered so it would also create a task in D state if the manager
doesn't read the event.

The major design issue: it overall looks superfluous as the manager can
check for -ENOSPC in the background transfer:

	if (mmget_not_zero(ctx->mm)) {
	} else {
		return -ENOSPC;

It's safer to roll it back and re-introduce it later if at all.

[ documentation fixup after removal of UFFD_EVENT_EXIT]
Link: default avatarAndrea Arcangeli <>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMike Rapoport <>
Acked-by: default avatarMike Rapoport <>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <>
Cc: Hillf Danton <>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <>
parent b2e593e2
......@@ -172,10 +172,6 @@ the same read(2) protocol as for the page fault notifications. The
manager has to explicitly enable these events by setting appropriate
bits in uffdio_api.features passed to UFFDIO_API ioctl:
UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_EXIT - enable notification about exit() of the
non-cooperative process. When the monitored process exits, the uffd
manager will get UFFD_EVENT_EXIT.
UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK - enable userfaultfd hooks for fork(). When
this feature is enabled, the userfaultfd context of the parent process
is duplicated into the newly created process. The manager receives
......@@ -775,34 +775,6 @@ void userfaultfd_unmap_complete(struct mm_struct *mm, struct list_head *uf)
void userfaultfd_exit(struct mm_struct *mm)
struct vm_area_struct *vma = mm->mmap;
* We can do the vma walk without locking because the caller
* (exit_mm) knows it now has exclusive access
while (vma) {
struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx = vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx;
if (ctx && (ctx->features & UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_EXIT)) {
struct userfaultfd_wait_queue ewq;
ewq.msg.event = UFFD_EVENT_EXIT;
userfaultfd_event_wait_completion(ctx, &ewq);
ctx->features &= ~UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_EXIT;
vma = vma->vm_next;
static int userfaultfd_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
......@@ -72,8 +72,6 @@ extern int userfaultfd_unmap_prep(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
extern void userfaultfd_unmap_complete(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct list_head *uf);
extern void userfaultfd_exit(struct mm_struct *mm);
/* mm helpers */
......@@ -139,10 +137,6 @@ static inline void userfaultfd_unmap_complete(struct mm_struct *mm,
static inline void userfaultfd_exit(struct mm_struct *mm)
......@@ -18,8 +18,7 @@
* means the userland is reading).
#define UFFD_API ((__u64)0xAA)
......@@ -113,7 +112,6 @@ struct uffd_msg {
#define UFFD_EVENT_REMAP 0x14
#define UFFD_EVENT_REMOVE 0x15
#define UFFD_EVENT_UNMAP 0x16
#define UFFD_EVENT_EXIT 0x17
/* flags for UFFD_EVENT_PAGEFAULT */
#define UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WRITE (1<<0) /* If this was a write fault */
......@@ -163,7 +161,6 @@ struct uffdio_api {
__u64 features;
__u64 ioctls;
......@@ -554,7 +554,6 @@ static void exit_mm(void)
enter_lazy_tlb(mm, current);
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_MEMDIE))
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