Currently, when passed a key that already exists, add_key() will call the
key's ->update() method if such exists.  But this is heavily broken in the
case where the key is uninstantiated because it doesn't call
__key_instantiate_and_link().  Consequently, it doesn't do most of the
things that are supposed to happen when the key is instantiated, such as
setting the instantiation state, clearing KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT and
awakening tasks waiting on it, and incrementing key->user->nikeys.

It also never takes key_construction_mutex, which means that
->instantiate() can run concurrently with ->update() on the same key.  In
the case of the "user" and "logon" key types this causes a memory leak, at
best.  Maybe even worse, the ->update() methods of the "encrypted" and
"trusted" key types actually just dereference a NULL pointer when passed an
uninstantiated key.

Change key_create_or_update() to wait interruptibly for the key to finish
construction before continuing.

This patch only affects *uninstantiated* keys.  For now we still allow a
negatively instantiated key to be updated (thereby positively
instantiating it), although that's broken too (the next patch fixes it)
and I'm not sure that anyone actually uses that functionality either.

Here is a simple reproducer for the bug using the "encrypted" key type
(requires CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS=y), though as noted above the bug
pertained to more than just the "encrypted" key type:

    #include <stdlib.h>
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <keyutils.h>

    int main(void)
    {
        int ringid = keyctl_join_session_keyring(NULL);

        if (fork()) {
            for (;;) {
                const char payload[] = "update user:foo 32";

                usleep(rand() % 10000);
                add_key("encrypted", "desc", payload, sizeof(payload), ringid);
                keyctl_clear(ringid);
            }
        } else {
            for (;;)
                request_key("encrypted", "desc", "callout_info", ringid);
        }
    }

It causes:

    BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
    IP: encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170
    PGD 7a178067 P4D 7a178067 PUD 77269067 PMD 0
    PREEMPT SMP
    CPU: 0 PID: 340 Comm: reproduce Tainted: G      D         4.14.0-rc1-00025-g428490e3

 #796
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    task: ffff8a467a39a340 task.stack: ffffb15c40770000
    RIP: 0010:encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170
    RSP: 0018:ffffb15c40773de8 EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8a467a275b00 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffff8a467a275b14 RDI: ffffffffb742f303
    RBP: ffffb15c40773e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8a467a275b17
    R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8a4677057180 R15: ffff8a467a275b0f
    FS:  00007f5d7fb08700(0000) GS:ffff8a467f200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000077262005 CR4: 00000000001606f0
    Call Trace:
     key_create_or_update+0x2bc/0x460
     SyS_add_key+0x10c/0x1d0
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
    RIP: 0033:0x7f5d7f211259
    RSP: 002b:00007ffed03904c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f8
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000003b2a7955 RCX: 00007f5d7f211259
    RDX: 00000000004009e4 RSI: 00000000004009ff RDI: 0000000000400a04
    RBP: 0000000068db8bad R08: 000000003b2a7955 R09: 0000000000000004
    R10: 000000000000001a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400868
    R13: 00007ffed03905d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
    Code: 77 28 e8 64 34 1f 00 45 31 c0 31 c9 48 8d 55 c8 48 89 df 48 8d 75 d0 e8 ff f9 ff ff 85 c0 41 89 c4 0f 88 84 00 00 00 4c 8b 7d c8 <49> 8b 75 18 4c 89 ff e8 24 f8 ff ff 85 c0 41 89 c4 78 6d 49 8b
    RIP: encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170 RSP: ffffb15c40773de8
    CR2: 0000000000000018

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.12+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>