1. 29 Sep, 2018 1 commit
  2. 26 Sep, 2018 3 commits
  3. 15 Sep, 2018 1 commit
  4. 09 Sep, 2018 1 commit
    • Eddie.Horng's avatar
      cap_inode_getsecurity: use d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias() · 5a842ecc
      Eddie.Horng authored
      commit 355139a8 upstream.
      The code in cap_inode_getsecurity(), introduced by commit 8db6c34f
      ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities"), should use
      d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias() do handle unhashed dentry
      correctly. This is needed, for example, if execveat() is called with an
      open but unlinked overlayfs file, because overlayfs unhashes dentry on
      This is a regression of real life application, first reported at
      Below reproducer and setup can reproduce the case.
        const char* exec="echo";
        const char *newargv[] = { "echo", "hello", NULL};
        const char *newenviron[] = { NULL };
        int fd, err;
        fd = open(exec, O_PATH);
        err = syscall(322/*SYS_execveat*/, fd, "", newargv, newenviron,
          fprintf(stderr, "execveat: %s\n", strerror(errno));
      gcc compile into ~/test/a.out
      mount -t overlay -orw,lowerdir=/mnt/l,upperdir=/mnt/u,workdir=/mnt/w
      none /mnt/m
      cd /mnt/m
      cp /bin/echo .
      Expected result:
      Actually result:
      execveat: Invalid argument
      Invalid argument reading file caps for /dev/fd/3
      The 2nd reproducer and setup emulates similar case but for
      regular filesystem:
        const char* exec="echo";
        int fd, err;
        char buf[256];
        fd = open(exec, O_RDONLY);
        err = fgetxattr(fd, "security.capability", buf, 256);
          fprintf(stderr, "fgetxattr: %s\n", strerror(errno));
      gcc compile into ~/test_fgetxattr
      cd /tmp
      cp /bin/echo .
      fgetxattr: Invalid argument
      On regular filesystem, for example, ext4 read xattr from
      disk and return to execveat(), will not trigger this issue, however,
      the overlay attr handler pass real dentry to vfs_getxattr() will.
      This reproducer calls fgetxattr() with an unlinked fd, involkes
      vfs_getxattr() then reproduced the case that d_find_alias() in
      cap_inode_getsecurity() can't find the unlinked dentry.
      Suggested-by: 's avatarAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: 's avatarAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: 's avatarSerge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
      Fixes: 8db6c34f ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarEddie Horng <eddie.horng@mediatek.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
  5. 24 Aug, 2018 1 commit
  6. 03 Aug, 2018 1 commit
  7. 05 Jun, 2018 1 commit
    • Sachin Grover's avatar
      selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecurity · 9808c97d
      Sachin Grover authored
      commit efe3de79 upstream.
      Call trace:
       [<ffffff9203a8d7a8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x428
       [<ffffff9203a8dbf8>] show_stack+0x28/0x38
       [<ffffff920409bfb8>] dump_stack+0xd4/0x124
       [<ffffff9203d187e8>] print_address_description+0x68/0x258
       [<ffffff9203d18c00>] kasan_report.part.2+0x228/0x2f0
       [<ffffff9203d1927c>] kasan_report+0x5c/0x70
       [<ffffff9203d1776c>] check_memory_region+0x12c/0x1c0
       [<ffffff9203d17cdc>] memcpy+0x34/0x68
       [<ffffff9203d75348>] xattr_getsecurity+0xe0/0x160
       [<ffffff9203d75490>] vfs_getxattr+0xc8/0x120
       [<ffffff9203d75d68>] getxattr+0x100/0x2c8
       [<ffffff9203d76fb4>] SyS_fgetxattr+0x64/0xa0
       [<ffffff9203a83f70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
      If user get root access and calls security.selinux setxattr() with an
      embedded NUL on a file and then if some process performs a getxattr()
      on that file with a length greater than the actual length of the string,
      it would result in a panic.
      To fix this, add the actual length of the string to the security context
      instead of the length passed by the userspace process.
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarSachin Grover <sgrover@codeaurora.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
  8. 30 May, 2018 3 commits
    • Petr Vorel's avatar
      ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm · cd2399b4
      Petr Vorel authored
      [ Upstream commit ab60368a ]
      IMA requires having it's hash algorithm be compiled-in due to it's
      early use.  The default IMA algorithm is protected by Kconfig to be
      The ima_hash kernel parameter allows to choose the hash algorithm. When
      the specified algorithm is not available or available as a module, IMA
      initialization fails, which leads to a kernel panic (mknodat syscall calls
      ima_post_path_mknod()).  Therefore as fallback we force IMA to use
      the default builtin Kconfig hash algorithm.
      Fixed crash:
      $ grep CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4 .config
      [    0.000000] Command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-4.12.14-2.3-default root=UUID=74ae8202-9ca7-4e39-813b-22287ec52f7a video=1024x768-16 plymouth.ignore-serial-consoles console=ttyS0 console=tty resume=/dev/disk/by-path/pci-0000:00:07.0-part3 splash=silent showopts ima_hash=md4
      [    1.545190] ima: Can not allocate md4 (reason: -2)
      [    2.610120] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
      [    2.611903] IP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390
      [    2.612967] PGD 0 P4D 0
      [    2.613080] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
      [    2.613080] Modules linked in: autofs4
      [    2.613080] Supported: Yes
      [    2.613080] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.12.14-2.3-default #1
      [    2.613080] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
      [    2.613080] task: ffff88003e2d0040 task.stack: ffffc90000190000
      [    2.613080] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390
      [    2.613080] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000193e88 EFLAGS: 00010296
      [    2.613080] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 0000000000000004
      [    2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff880037071728
      [    2.613080] RBP: 0000000000008000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
      [    2.613080] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 61c8864680b583eb R12: 00005580ff10086f
      [    2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000008000
      [    2.613080] FS:  00007f5c1da08940(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      [    2.613080] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      [    2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000037002000 CR4: 00000000003406f0
      [    2.613080] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
      [    2.613080] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
      [    2.613080] Call Trace:
      [    2.613080]  ? shmem_mknod+0xbf/0xd0
      [    2.613080]  ima_post_path_mknod+0x1c/0x40
      [    2.613080]  SyS_mknod+0x210/0x220
      [    2.613080]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
      [    2.613080] RIP: 0033:0x7f5c1bfde570
      [    2.613080] RSP: 002b:00007ffde1c90dc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000085
      [    2.613080] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5c1bfde570
      [    2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000008000 RDI: 00005580ff10086f
      [    2.613080] RBP: 00007ffde1c91040 R08: 00005580ff10086f R09: 0000000000000000
      [    2.613080] R10: 0000000000104000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005580ffb99660
      [    2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002
      [    2.613080] Code: 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 44 8d 14 09 41 55 41 54 55 53 44 89 d3 09 cb 48 83 ec 38 48 8b 05 c5 03 29 01 <4c> 8b 20 4c 39 e0 0f 84 d7 01 00 00 4c 89 44 24 08 89 54 24 20
      [    2.613080] RIP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 RSP: ffffc90000193e88
      [    2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000
      [    2.613080] ---[ end trace 9a9f0a8a73079f6a ]---
      [    2.673052] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009
      [    2.673052]
      [    2.675337] Kernel Offset: disabled
      [    2.676405] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarPetr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarSasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    • Jiandi An's avatar
      ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interface · bc72e4fc
      Jiandi An authored
      [ Upstream commit fac37c62 ]
      TPM_CRB driver provides TPM CRB 2.0 support.  If it is built as a
      module, the TPM chip is registered after IMA init.  tpm_pcr_read() in
      IMA fails and displays the following message even though eventually
      there is a TPM chip on the system.
      ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=-19)
      Fix IMA Kconfig to select TPM_CRB so TPM_CRB driver is built in the kernel
      and initializes before IMA.
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarJiandi An <anjiandi@codeaurora.org>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarSasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    • Randy Dunlap's avatar
      integrity/security: fix digsig.c build error with header file · 09897fcb
      Randy Dunlap authored
      [ Upstream commit 120f3b11 ]
      security/integrity/digsig.c has build errors on some $ARCH due to a
      missing header file, so add it.
        security/integrity/digsig.c:146:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
      Reported-by: 's avatarMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
      Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/Signed-off-by: 's avatarJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarSasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
  9. 29 Apr, 2018 1 commit
  10. 19 Apr, 2018 3 commits
  11. 24 Mar, 2018 1 commit
  12. 19 Mar, 2018 1 commit
  13. 25 Feb, 2018 2 commits
  14. 03 Feb, 2018 1 commit
  15. 17 Jan, 2018 2 commits
  16. 10 Jan, 2018 1 commit
  17. 05 Jan, 2018 1 commit
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      capabilities: fix buffer overread on very short xattr · df4373c5
      Eric Biggers authored
      commit dc32b5c3 upstream.
      If userspace attempted to set a "security.capability" xattr shorter than
      4 bytes (e.g. 'setfattr -n security.capability -v x file'), then
      cap_convert_nscap() read past the end of the buffer containing the xattr
      value because it accessed the ->magic_etc field without verifying that
      the xattr value is long enough to contain that field.
      Fix it by validating the xattr value size first.
      This bug was found using syzkaller with KASAN.  The KASAN report was as
      follows (cleaned up slightly):
          BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498
          Read of size 4 at addr ffff88002d8741c0 by task syz-executor1/2852
          CPU: 0 PID: 2852 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc6-00200-gcc0aac99d977 #253
          Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
          Call Trace:
           __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
           dump_stack+0xe3/0x195 lib/dump_stack.c:53
           print_address_description+0x73/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252
           kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
           kasan_report+0x235/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
           cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498
           setxattr+0x2bd/0x350 fs/xattr.c:446
           path_setxattr+0x168/0x1b0 fs/xattr.c:472
           SYSC_setxattr fs/xattr.c:487 [inline]
           SyS_setxattr+0x36/0x50 fs/xattr.c:483
      Fixes: 8db6c34f ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: 's avatarSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
  18. 02 Jan, 2018 1 commit
    • Dave Hansen's avatar
      x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig · 3dfd9fd8
      Dave Hansen authored
      commit 385ce0ea upstream.
      Finally allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to be enabled.
      PARAVIRT generally requires that the kernel not manage its own page tables.
      It also means that the hypervisor and kernel must agree wholeheartedly
      about what format the page tables are in and what they contain.
      PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION, unfortunately, changes the rules and they
      can not be used together.
      I've seen conflicting feedback from maintainers lately about whether they
      want the Kconfig magic to go first or last in a patch series.  It's going
      last here because the partially-applied series leads to kernels that can
      not boot in a bunch of cases.  I did a run through the entire series with
      CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y to look for build errors, though.
      [ tglx: Removed SMP and !PARAVIRT dependencies as they not longer exist ]
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
  19. 14 Dec, 2017 3 commits
  20. 10 Dec, 2017 1 commit
  21. 05 Dec, 2017 1 commit
    • John Johansen's avatar
      apparmor: fix oops in audit_signal_cb hook · 69af2269
      John Johansen authored
      commit b12cbb21 upstream.
      The apparmor_audit_data struct ordering got messed up during a merge
      conflict, resulting in the signal integer and peer pointer being in
      a union instead of a struct.
      For most of the 4.13 and 4.14 life cycle, this was hidden by
      commit 651e28c5 ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket
      mediation") which fixed the apparmor_audit_data struct when its data
      was added. When that commit was reverted in -rc7 the signal audit bug
      was exposed, and unfortunately it never showed up in any of the
      testing until after 4.14 was released. Shaun Khan, Zephaniah
      E. Loss-Cutler-Hull filed nearly simultaneous bug reports (with
      different oopes, the smaller of which is included below).
      Full credit goes to Tetsuo Handa for jumping on this as well and
      noticing the audit data struct problem and reporting it.
      [   76.178568] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
      [   76.178579] IP: audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0
      [   76.178581] PGD 1a640a067 P4D 1a640a067 PUD 0
      [   76.178586] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
      [   76.178589] Modules linked in: fuse rfcomm bnep usblp uvcvideo btusb
      btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic ip6table_filter ip6_tables
      xt_tcpudp nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack
      iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables intel_rapl joydev wmi_bmof serio_raw
      iwldvm iwlwifi shpchp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass autofs4 algif_skcipher
      nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel
      [   76.178620] CPU: 0 PID: 10675 Comm: pidgin Not tainted
      4.14.0-f1-dirty #135
      [   76.178623] Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP EliteBook Folio
      9470m/18DF, BIOS 68IBD Ver. F.62 10/22/2015
      [   76.178625] task: ffff9c7a94c31dc0 task.stack: ffffa09b02a4c000
      [   76.178628] RIP: 0010:audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0
      [   76.178631] RSP: 0018:ffffa09b02a4fc08 EFLAGS: 00010292
      [   76.178634] RAX: ffffa09b02a4fd60 RBX: ffff9c7aee0741f8 RCX:
      [   76.178636] RDX: ffffffffee012290 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI:
      [   76.178638] RBP: ffffa09b02a4fd40 R08: 000000000000004d R09:
      [   76.178641] R10: ffffa09b02a4fcb8 R11: ffff9c7ab44f5072 R12:
      [   76.178643] R13: ffffffff9e447be0 R14: ffff9c7a94c31dc0 R15:
      [   76.178646] FS:  00007f8b11ba2a80(0000) GS:ffff9c7afea00000(0000)
      [   76.178648] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      [   76.178650] CR2: ffffffff0eee3bc0 CR3: 00000003d5209002 CR4:
      [   76.178652] Call Trace:
      [   76.178660]  common_lsm_audit+0x1da/0x780
      [   76.178665]  ? d_absolute_path+0x60/0x90
      [   76.178669]  ? aa_check_perms+0xcd/0xe0
      [   76.178672]  aa_check_perms+0xcd/0xe0
      [   76.178675]  profile_signal_perm.part.0+0x90/0xa0
      [   76.178679]  aa_may_signal+0x16e/0x1b0
      [   76.178686]  apparmor_task_kill+0x51/0x120
      [   76.178690]  security_task_kill+0x44/0x60
      [   76.178695]  group_send_sig_info+0x25/0x60
      [   76.178699]  kill_pid_info+0x36/0x60
      [   76.178703]  SYSC_kill+0xdb/0x180
      [   76.178707]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x92/0xd0
      [   76.178712]  ? _raw_write_unlock_irq+0x13/0x30
      [   76.178716]  ? task_work_run+0x6a/0x90
      [   76.178720]  ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x80/0xa0
      [   76.178723]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94
      [   76.178727] RIP: 0033:0x7f8b0e58b767
      [   76.178729] RSP: 002b:00007fff19efd4d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX:
      [   76.178732] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557f3e3c2050 RCX:
      [   76.178735] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI:
      [   76.178737] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000557f3e3c2270 R09:
      [   76.178739] R10: 000000000000022d R11: 0000000000000206 R12:
      [   76.178741] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000557f3e3c13c0 R15:
      [   76.178745] Code: 48 8b 55 18 48 89 df 41 b8 20 00 08 01 5b 5d 48 8b
      42 10 48 8b 52 30 48 63 48 4c 48 8b 44 c8 48 31 c9 48 8b 70 38 e9 f4 fd
      00 00 <48> 8b 14 d5 40 27 e5 9e 48 c7 c6 7d 07 19 9f 48 89 df e8 fd 35
      [   76.178794] RIP: audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0 RSP: ffffa09b02a4fc08
      [   76.178796] CR2: ffffffff0eee3bc0
      [   76.178799] ---[ end trace 514af9529297f1a3 ]---
      Fixes: cd1dbf76 ("apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals")
      Reported-by: 's avatarZephaniah E. Loss-Cutler-Hull <warp-spam_kernel@aehallh.com>
      Reported-by: 's avatarShuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
      Suggested-by: 's avatarTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
      Tested-by: 's avatarIvan Kozik <ivan@ludios.org>
      Tested-by: 's avatarZephaniah E. Loss-Cutler-Hull <warp-spam_kernel@aehallh.com>
      Tested-by: 's avatarChristian Boltz <apparmor@cboltz.de>
      Tested-by: 's avatarShuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
  22. 24 Nov, 2017 1 commit
  23. 08 Nov, 2017 1 commit
  24. 02 Nov, 2017 3 commits
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license · b2441318
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
      makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
      By default all files without license information are under the default
      license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
      Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
      SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
      shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
      This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
      Philippe Ombredanne.
      How this work was done:
      Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
      the use cases:
       - file had no licensing information it it.
       - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
       - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
      Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
      where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
      had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
      The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
      a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
      output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
      tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
      base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
      The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
      assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
      results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
      to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
      immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
       - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
       - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
         lines of source
       - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
      All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
      The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
      identifiers to apply.
       - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
         considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
         COPYING file license applied.
         For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         GPL-2.0                                              11139
         and resulted in the first patch in this series.
         If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
         Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930
         and resulted in the second patch in this series.
       - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
         of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
         any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
         it (per prior point).  Results summary:
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
         GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
         LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
         GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
         ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
         LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
         LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1
         and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
       - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
         the concluded license(s).
       - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
         license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
         licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
       - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
         resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
         which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
       - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
         confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
       - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
         the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
         in time.
      In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
      spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
      source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
      by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
      FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
      disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
      Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
      they are related.
      Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
      for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
      files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
      in about 15000 files.
      In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
      copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
      correct identifier.
      Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
      inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
      version early this week with:
       - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
         license ids and scores
       - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
         files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
       - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
         was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
         SPDX license was correct
      This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
      worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
      different types of files to be modified.
      These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
      parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
      format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
      based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
      distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
      comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
      generate the patches.
      Reviewed-by: 's avatarKate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
      Reviewed-by: 's avatarPhilippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
      Reviewed-by: 's avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read() · a3c812f7
      Eric Biggers authored
      When calling keyctl_read() on a key of type "trusted", if the
      user-supplied buffer was too small, the kernel ignored the buffer length
      and just wrote past the end of the buffer, potentially corrupting
      userspace memory.  Fix it by instead returning the size required, as per
      the documentation for keyctl_read().
      We also don't even fill the buffer at all in this case, as this is
      slightly easier to implement than doing a short read, and either
      behavior appears to be permitted.  It also makes it match the behavior
      of the "encrypted" key type.
      Fixes: d00a1c72 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
      Reported-by: 's avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.38+
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: 's avatarMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Reviewed-by: 's avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      KEYS: return full count in keyring_read() if buffer is too small · 3239b6f2
      Eric Biggers authored
      Commit e645016a ("KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer
      in keyring_read()") made keyring_read() stop corrupting userspace memory
      when the user-supplied buffer is too small.  However it also made the
      return value in that case be the short buffer size rather than the size
      required, yet keyctl_read() is actually documented to return the size
      required.  Therefore, switch it over to the documented behavior.
      Note that for now we continue to have it fill the short buffer, since it
      did that before (pre-v3.13) and dump_key_tree_aux() in keyutils arguably
      relies on it.
      Fixes: e645016a ("KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer in keyring_read()")
      Reported-by: 's avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.13+
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: 's avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
  25. 26 Oct, 2017 1 commit
  26. 19 Oct, 2017 1 commit
  27. 18 Oct, 2017 2 commits