• Peter Zijlstra's avatar
    futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex · 1352130f
    Peter Zijlstra authored
    commit c1e2f0ea upstream.
    Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:
       waiter                                  waker                                            stealer (prio > waiter)
       futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
             timeout=[N ms])
                <scheduled out>
                                               futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
                                               futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
                                                     uaddr2, 1, 0)
                                                  /* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
                                               futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
                                                        cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
               <woken by waker>
               <hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
                clears sleeper->task>
                                                                                               futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
                                                                                                     try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
                                                                                                        rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
             <scheduled in>
                   try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
                   if (timeout && !timeout->task)
                      return -ETIMEDOUT;
                   /* lock wasn't acquired, so,
                      fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */
       return -ETIMEDOUT;
       /* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
        * futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
        * stealer as the owner */
       futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
         -> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.
    And suggested that what commit:
      73d786bd ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
    removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
    it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
    case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
      16ffa12d ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")
    changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:
    -               if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
    -                       locked = 1;
    -                       goto out;
    -               }
    -               raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
    -               owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
    -               if (!owner)
    -                       owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
    -               raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
    -               ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);
    already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
    at next_owner.
    So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
    what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
    of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
    rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.
    Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
    testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
    we have the wait_lock.
    Fixes: 73d786bd ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
    Reported-by: default avatarJulia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
    Reported-by: default avatarGratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    Tested-by: default avatarJulia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
    Tested-by: default avatarGratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
    Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
    Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.netSigned-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>