Commit 8aec0f5d authored by Mathieu Desnoyers's avatar Mathieu Desnoyers Committed by Linus Torvalds

Fix: compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() misuse in aio, readv, writev, and security keys

Looking at mm/process_vm_access.c:process_vm_rw() and comparing it to
compat_process_vm_rw() shows that the compatibility code requires an
explicit "access_ok()" check before calling
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(). The same difference seems to appear when
we compare fs/read_write.c:do_readv_writev() to
fs/compat.c:compat_do_readv_writev().

This subtle difference between the compat and non-compat requirements
should probably be debated, as it seems to be error-prone. In fact,
there are two others sites that use this function in the Linux kernel,
and they both seem to get it wrong:

Now shifting our attention to fs/aio.c, we see that aio_setup_iocb()
also ends up calling compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() through
aio_setup_vectored_rw(). Unfortunately, the access_ok() check appears to
be missing. Same situation for
security/keys/compat.c:compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov().

I propose that we add the access_ok() check directly into
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(), so callers don't have to worry about it,
and it therefore makes the compat call code similar to its non-compat
counterpart. Place the access_ok() check in the same location where
copy_from_user() can trigger a -EFAULT error in the non-compat code, so
the ABI behaviors are alike on both compat and non-compat.

While we are here, fix compat_do_readv_writev() so it checks for
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() negative return values.

And also, fix a memory leak in compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov() error
handling.
Acked-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
parent c39ac49f
......@@ -558,6 +558,10 @@ ssize_t compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(int type,
}
*ret_pointer = iov;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uvector, nr_segs*sizeof(*uvector)))
goto out;
/*
* Single unix specification:
* We should -EINVAL if an element length is not >= 0 and fitting an
......@@ -1080,17 +1084,12 @@ static ssize_t compat_do_readv_writev(int type, struct file *file,
if (!file->f_op)
goto out;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uvector, nr_segs*sizeof(*uvector)))
goto out;
tot_len = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(type, uvector, nr_segs,
ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(type, uvector, nr_segs,
UIO_FASTIOV, iovstack, &iov);
if (tot_len == 0) {
ret = 0;
if (ret <= 0)
goto out;
}
tot_len = ret;
ret = rw_verify_area(type, file, pos, tot_len);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
......
......@@ -429,12 +429,6 @@ compat_process_vm_rw(compat_pid_t pid,
if (flags != 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, lvec, liovcnt * sizeof(*lvec)))
goto out;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, rvec, riovcnt * sizeof(*rvec)))
goto out;
if (vm_write)
rc = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, lvec, liovcnt,
UIO_FASTIOV, iovstack_l,
......@@ -459,8 +453,6 @@ free_iovecs:
kfree(iov_r);
if (iov_l != iovstack_l)
kfree(iov_l);
out:
return rc;
}
......
......@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ static long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack),
iovstack, &iov);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
goto err;
if (ret == 0)
goto no_payload_free;
ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid);
err:
if (iov != iovstack)
kfree(iov);
return ret;
......
Markdown is supported
0%
or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment