Commit 9d57a7f9 authored by Ahmed S. Darwish's avatar Ahmed S. Darwish Committed by James Morris

SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports

Setup the new Audit LSM hooks for SELinux.
Remove the now redundant exported SELinux Audit interface.

Audit: Export 'audit_krule' and 'audit_field' to the public
since their internals are needed by the implementation of the
new LSM hook 'audit_rule_known'.
Signed-off-by: default avatarCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAhmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: default avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
parent d7a96f3a
......@@ -353,6 +353,33 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms;
struct linux_binprm;
struct mq_attr;
struct mqstat;
struct audit_watch;
struct audit_tree;
struct audit_krule {
int vers_ops;
u32 flags;
u32 listnr;
u32 action;
u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
u32 field_count;
char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */
struct audit_field *fields;
struct audit_field *arch_f; /* quick access to arch field */
struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
struct audit_tree *tree; /* associated watched tree */
struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_{watch,tree}.rules list */
};
struct audit_field {
u32 type;
u32 val;
u32 op;
char *se_str;
void *se_rule;
};
#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
......@@ -536,6 +563,8 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab,
const char *prefix,
struct path *path);
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
/* Private API (for audit.c only) */
extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
extern int audit_filter_type(int type);
......
......@@ -20,54 +20,6 @@ struct kern_ipc_perm;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
/**
* selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
* @field: the field this rule refers to
* @op: the operater the rule uses
* @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
* @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
*
* Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure
* will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with
* selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
*/
int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
struct selinux_audit_rule **rule);
/**
* selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
* @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
*
* This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
* If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
*/
void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule);
/**
* selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
* @sid: the context ID to check
* @field: the field this rule refers to
* @op: the operater the rule uses
* @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
* @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
*
* Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
* -errno on failure.
*/
int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
struct audit_context *actx);
/**
* selinux_audit_set_callback - set the callback for policy reloads.
* @callback: the function to call when the policy is reloaded
*
* This sets the function callback function that will update the rules
* upon policy reloads. This callback should rebuild all existing rules
* using selinux_audit_rule_init().
*/
void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void));
/**
* selinux_string_to_sid - map a security context string to a security ID
* @str: the security context string to be mapped
......@@ -111,30 +63,6 @@ void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
#else
static inline int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op,
char *rulestr,
struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
{
return;
}
static inline int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
{
return;
}
static inline int selinux_string_to_sid(const char *str, u32 *sid)
{
*sid = 0;
......
......@@ -65,34 +65,9 @@ struct audit_watch {
struct list_head rules; /* associated rules */
};
struct audit_field {
u32 type;
u32 val;
u32 op;
char *se_str;
struct selinux_audit_rule *se_rule;
};
struct audit_tree;
struct audit_chunk;
struct audit_krule {
int vers_ops;
u32 flags;
u32 listnr;
u32 action;
u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
u32 field_count;
char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */
struct audit_field *fields;
struct audit_field *arch_f; /* quick access to arch field */
struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
struct audit_tree *tree; /* associated watched tree */
struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_{watch,tree}.rules list */
};
struct audit_entry {
struct list_head list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
......
......@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
#include "netport.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
#include "netlabel.h"
#include "audit.h"
#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
......@@ -5478,6 +5479,13 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.key_free = selinux_key_free,
.key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
.audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
.audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
.audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
.audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
#endif
};
static __init int selinux_init(void)
......
......@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
#include "netlabel.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
#include "ebitmap.h"
#include "audit.h"
extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
......@@ -2296,21 +2297,23 @@ struct selinux_audit_rule {
struct context au_ctxt;
};
void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
{
struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
if (rule) {
context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
kfree(rule);
}
}
int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
{
struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
struct role_datum *roledatum;
struct type_datum *typedatum;
struct user_datum *userdatum;
struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
int rc = 0;
*rule = NULL;
......@@ -2397,12 +2400,37 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
return rc;
}
int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
struct context *ctxt;
struct mls_level *level;
struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
int match = 0;
if (!rule) {
......@@ -2509,7 +2537,7 @@ out:
return match;
}
static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = NULL;
static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
......@@ -2534,11 +2562,6 @@ static int __init aurule_init(void)
}
__initcall(aurule_init);
void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
{
aurule_callback = callback;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
/**
* security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
......
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