Commit a56de6cd authored by Stefano Brivio's avatar Stefano Brivio Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman

neighbour: Avoid writing before skb->head in neigh_hh_output()

[ Upstream commit e6ac64d4c4d095085d7dd71cbd05704ac99829b2 ]

While skb_push() makes the kernel panic if the skb headroom is less than
the unaligned hardware header size, it will proceed normally in case we
copy more than that because of alignment, and we'll silently corrupt
adjacent slabs.

In the case fixed by the previous patch,
"ipv6: Check available headroom in ip6_xmit() even without options", we
end up in neigh_hh_output() with 14 bytes headroom, 14 bytes hardware
header and write 16 bytes, starting 2 bytes before the allocated buffer.

Always check we're not writing before skb->head and, if the headroom is
not enough, warn and drop the packet.

v2:
 - instead of panicking with BUG_ON(), WARN_ON_ONCE() and drop the packet
   (Eric Dumazet)
 - if we avoid the panic, though, we need to explicitly check the headroom
   before the memcpy(), otherwise we'll have corrupted slabs on a running
   kernel, after we warn
 - use __skb_push() instead of skb_push(), as the headroom check is
   already implemented here explicitly (Eric Dumazet)
Signed-off-by: 's avatarStefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: 's avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: 's avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent 2da7c7b2
......@@ -448,6 +448,7 @@ static inline int neigh_hh_bridge(struct hh_cache *hh, struct sk_buff *skb)
static inline int neigh_hh_output(const struct hh_cache *hh, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
unsigned int hh_alen = 0;
unsigned int seq;
int hh_len;
......@@ -455,16 +456,33 @@ static inline int neigh_hh_output(const struct hh_cache *hh, struct sk_buff *skb
seq = read_seqbegin(&hh->hh_lock);
hh_len = hh->hh_len;
if (likely(hh_len <= HH_DATA_MOD)) {
hh_alen = HH_DATA_MOD;
/* skb_push() would proceed silently if we have room for
* the unaligned size but not for the aligned size:
* check headroom explicitly.
*/
if (likely(skb_headroom(skb) >= HH_DATA_MOD)) {
/* this is inlined by gcc */
memcpy(skb->data - HH_DATA_MOD, hh->hh_data, HH_DATA_MOD);
memcpy(skb->data - HH_DATA_MOD, hh->hh_data,
HH_DATA_MOD);
}
} else {
int hh_alen = HH_DATA_ALIGN(hh_len);
hh_alen = HH_DATA_ALIGN(hh_len);
memcpy(skb->data - hh_alen, hh->hh_data, hh_alen);
if (likely(skb_headroom(skb) >= hh_alen)) {
memcpy(skb->data - hh_alen, hh->hh_data,
hh_alen);
}
}
} while (read_seqretry(&hh->hh_lock, seq));
skb_push(skb, hh_len);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(skb_headroom(skb) < hh_alen)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_XMIT_DROP;
}
__skb_push(skb, hh_len);
return dev_queue_xmit(skb);
}
......
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